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caused	about	13	percent	of	civilian	deaths,	
unexploded	 cluster-bomb	 submunitions	
proved	 a	 larger	 threat,	 contributing	 to	 al-
most	32	percent	of	deaths.	Some	observed	
that	 the	 likelihood	 of	 munitions	 malfunc-
tion	 was	 increasing	 through	 “the	 rapidly	
expanding	 use	 of	 mass-produced	 cluster	
munitions,	the	increased	reliance	on	highly	
sensitive	micro-electronics	in	munitions	and	
fuses,	 and	 quality-control	 problems	 in	 the	
defense	industry.”9
Proponents	 for	 international	 regulation	
of	 ERW	 advocated	 the	 addition	 of	 a	 pro-
tocol	 to	 the	 190	 Convention	 on	 Certain	
Conventional	Weapons	 to	address	humani-
tarian	concerns.	After	over	a	year	of	discus-
sion	 and	 preparation,	 CCW	 Protocol	V	
was	 adopted	 Nov.	 2,	 2003.	 Protocol	 V	
requires	 states	 to	 clear	 future	 ERW	 and	 to	
work	 together	 to	 “clear	 existing	 unexplod-
ed	 ordnance	 or	 abandoned	 ammunition,	
which	 can	 already	 be	 found	 in	 more	 than	





While	 not	 yet	 in	 force,	 Switzerland	
and	 Liechtenstein	 recently	 deposited	 in-
struments	of	ratification	on	May	12,	2006	
to	 reach	 the	 necessary	 20	 States	 Parties	
consenting	to	be	bound	to	Protocol	V.	As	
a	 result,	 Protocol	 V	 will	 now	 enter	 into	
force	 as	 a	 legally	 binding	 accord	 by	 the	
end	of	this	year,	on	Nov.	12,	2006.	Since	
then,	 countries	 have	 continued	 to	 ratify	
this	Protocol.12
A Legal Definition of ERW
Protocol	 V	 presents	 a	 legal	 precedent	
for	 defining	 explosive	 remnants	 of	 war.	 It	
defines	ERW	as	“unexploded	ordnance	and	
abandoned	 explosive	 ordnance.”13	 Protocol	
V	defines	UXO	 using	 the	 IMAS’	 standard	
definition	as	previously	cited;	 thus	 the	first	
part	 of	 this	 new	 legal	 definition	 of	 ERW	
differs	 little	 from	 older	 understandings	
of	 ERW-as-UXO.	 However,	 Protocol	 V’s	
definition	of	ERW	provides	 two	 important	




doned	 explosive	 ordnance.”	 Protocol	 V	 de-
fines	AXO	 as	 “explosive	 ordnance	 that	has	
not	 been	 used	 during	 an	 armed	 conflict,	





fused,	 armed	 or	 otherwise	 prepared	 for	
use.”13	This	means	 that	not	only	can	ERW	
be	 understood	 traditionally	 as	 resulting	







The	 second	 important	 caveat	 is	 that	





ERW	 can	 now	 be	 applied	 in	 international	
humanitarian	 law,	 Protocol	 V	 defines	 ex-
plosive ordnance	 (the	 common	 characteris-
tic	of	all	ERW)	as	“conventional	munitions	
containing	 explosives,	 with	 the	 exception	
of	mines,	booby	traps	and	other	devices	as	
defined	 in	 Protocol	 II	 of	 this	 Convention	
as	 amended	 on	 3	 May	 1996.”13	 This	
means	 that	 mines,	 including	 APMs1	 and	
AVMs,16,17	 booby	 traps	 and	 manually	 em-
placed	munitions/other	devices1		including	
improvised	explosive	devices19	are	excluded	
from	 Protocol	 V	 on	 ERW	 and	 legally	 are	
not	 defined	 as	 ERW.	 APMs	 also	 legally	
fall	under	the	jurisdiction	of	the	widely	rat-
ified	Ottawa	Convention’s	regulations.1
Practical Application of ERW





Meanwhile,	 what	 does	 ERW	 functionally	
mean?	 When	 organizations	 and	 clearance	
teams	are	working	to	“remove	ERW,”	what	
are	 they	 actually	 clearing	 on	 the	 ground?	
There	 is	not	a	prevailing	depiction	of	what	
actual	physical	ordnance	is	considered	to	be	
“explosive	 remnants	 of	 war”	 or	 how	 ERW	
clearance	 should	 be	 managed.	 Herein	 re-
sides	a	potentially	problematic	gap	between	





examines	 an	 analytical	 model	 published	


































































plosive	 ordnance	 that	 has	 been	primed,	 fused,	 armed	or	 otherwise	
prepared	for	use	or	used.	It	may	have	been	fired,	dropped,	launched	
or	projected	yet	remains	unexploded	either	through	malfunction	or	







plified	in	an	International Review of the Red Cross	article,	which	in-
cluded	in	its	definition	of	unexploded	munitions	“anti-personnel	
mines,	which	are	widely	prohibited,	as	well	as	anti-vehicle	mines,	
submunitions	 from	airborne	 cluster	 bombs	or	 land-based	 systems	
and	other	unexploded	ordnance.”	In	general,	 the	term	ERW	was	





Red	 Cross,	 Landmine	 Action	 U.K.	 and	 the	 Geneva	 International	






by Daniele Ressler [ Mine Action Information Center ]
This primer reviews the legal and functional understandings regarding explosive remnants of 
war, particularly after the adoption of Protocol V in the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons.1 It examines the tensions between the legal definition of ERW and the reality on 
the ground, and recommends clarifying the terms that bind post-conflict clearance efforts 
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Tension between Legal and 
Functional Definitions
The	 existence	 of	 a	 tension	 between	 le-
gal	 and	 functional	 definitions	 of	 ERW	
quickly	 becomes	 clear	 when	 examining	




legal	 definition	 reflects	 a	 paradoxical	 real-
ity:	 while	 mines,	 booby	 traps	 and	 IEDs	
cannot	 be	 legally	 included	 in	 Protocol	 V	
as	ERW,	practically they	are	all	highly	ex-





does	 not	 carry	 over	 with	 any	 importance	
into	functional	clearance	in	a	post-conflict	




explosive,	 they	 must	 be	 treated	 with	 the	
same	concern,	precision	and	technical	skill	
as	any	legally	defined	ERW.	
An	 additional	 tension	 relates	 to	 the	
function	 of	 weapons	 and	 the	 timing	 of	
their	 use.	 For	 example,	 if	 booby	 traps	 and	
IEDs	remain	after	a	conflict	and	are	rigged	








Protocol	 V,	 booby	 traps	 and	 IEDs	 present	
the	same	risk	of	explosion	and	the	same	need	
for	effective	and	successful	clearance.	
These	 tensions	 are	 of	 interest	 not	 for	








quired	 by	 both	 CCW	 Protocol	 V	 and	 the	
Ottawa	 Convention,	 and	 there	 is	 the	 need	
for	greatest	efficiency	in	order	to	best	protect	
and	serve	human	lives	at	risk.	This	requires	
coordination,	 sharing	 of	 information	 and	
collaborative	expertise.	
One	potential	pitfall	will	be	if	the	clear-
ance	 efforts	 of	 mines,	 booby	 traps,	 IEDs	
and	 ERW	 aren’t	 coordinated	 because	
their	 jurisdiction	 under	 humanitarian	 law	
doesn’t	 technically	 require	 carry-over	 of	
specific	 duties	 anywhere	 outside	 that	 spe-
cific	 legal	 mandate.	 For	 example,	 clear-
ance	of	 landmines	 is	required	through	the	
Ottawa	 Convention	 while	 clearance	 of	
ERW	 is	 required	 through	 CCW	 Protocol	
V.	 Humanitarian	 law	 provides	 the	 regula-
tion	 of	 clearance	 within	 each	 convention	
or	protocol,	but	there	is	no	guarantee	that	
effective	 clearance	 efforts	 will	 be	 well-
coordinated	 between	 signatory	 parties	 of	
these	separate	legal	agreements.	





of	 ERW	 “landmines,	 UXO	 and	 abandoned	
ammunition	 caches,”	 and	 in	 its	 humanitar-
ian	mine-action	program	it	“strives	to	reduce	












clearance	 activities,	 they	 have	 not	 yet	 had	

























and	 explosives	 in	 the	 possession	 of	 civilians	 and	 non-state	
actors
.	 Abandoned	 and/or	 damaged/disrupted	 stockpiles	 of	
ammunition	and	explosives21	




ian	 law?	 The	 relationship	 between	 practical	 and	 legal	 understand-





the	 IMAS).	However,	 at	 the	 time	of	publication,	both	AP	and	AV	




ger	 legally	 defined	 as	ERW	as	 they	 are	 codified	 separately	 and	 ex-
clusively	in	CCW	Amended	Protocol	II	or	the	Ottawa	Convention;	
thus,	mines	are	not	included	in	Table	1.	
This	 highlights	 a	 core	 tension	 between	 the	 functional	 and	 le-
gal	understanding	of	ERW	because,	although	ERW	does	not	legally	
include	 mines,	 they	 are	 still	 highly	 explosive	 munitions,	 a	 danger	













access	 denial	 devices.21	With	 these	 explosive	 threats	 present,	 aban-
doned	 AFVs	 are	 functionally	 considered	 ERW.	 The	 international	
legal	definition	of	ERW	would	also	ap-
pear	to	identify	AFVs	as	ERW,	though	
again	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 mines	
surrounding	 the	 AFV	 or	 any	 booby	
traps	 or	 improvised	 explosive	 devic-
es,	 as	 they	 are	 all	 codified	 in	 CCW	
Amended	 Protocol	 II.	 Additionally,	
AFVs	are	only	legally	considered	ERW	
once	 they	 are	 abandoned	 by	 the	 user	
party	 as	 AXO	 and	 only	 if	 they	 have	
explosive	properties.
Small	 arms	 and	 light	 weapons.	
SALW	 and	 their	 ammunition	 can	 be	
functionally	understood	as	ERW	due	
to	 their	 potential	 instability	 through	
aging	and	improper/unregulated	main-
tenance,	 leading	 to	 explosions.	 The	
GICHD	 defines	 SALW	 as	 “all	 lethal	






with	 the	 exception	 again	of	 any	mines,	 booby	 traps	 or	 improvised	
explosive	devices	that	might	be	carried	and	so	long	as	the	SALW	are	
not	being	carried	by	state	actors	for	official	use.
Stockpiles	 of	 ammunition	 and	 explosives.	 Stockpiles	 and	
caches2	of	ammunition	or	explosives	present	a	practical	ERW	threat	
through	 the	danger	of	 explosion,	which	can	be	devastating	 if	poor	
storage	 conditions	 lead	 to	 leaks	 or	 sudden	 movements	 resulting	 in	
spontaneous	combustion.	In	one	example,	a	January	2002	explosion	
at	 a	 government	 ammunition	 depot	 in	 Lagos,	 Nigeria,	 resulted	 in	
over	1,000	deaths.26	Legally,	if	stockpiles	are	understood	to	be	under	















Mortar shells Tank ammunition
Bomblets
Free-flight rockets Propellant-actuated 
devices
Torpedoes





Grenades Rocket ammunition Warheads
Cluster-bomb units Guided missiles

























Table 1. Examples of UXO that can be considered ERW under 
Protocol V.
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Mine-Recognition Cards Teach Adults, Children
A new set of playing cards are raising awareness and 
recognition of common landmines and explosives encountered 
globally. The cards help adults and children in mine-affected 
regions learn more about mines and how to identify them.
Each card carries the image of a frequently encountered 
mine, its country of origin, type and basic munitions 
details. The back of the cards carries a “DANGER: MINES” 
sign. Attention has been paid to consistency and correlation 
between suits: Clubs are anti-tank mines, diamonds are 
anti-personnel mines with the lowest metal content, hearts 
are AP mines with enough metal to make them detectable, 
and spades are fragmentation mines capable of injuring at 
great distances. 
In many cases, the card number relates directly to mine 
designation. Jokers are two of the most common and sensitive 
submunitions, BLU-97 and M42-type. In addition to being used 
in normal card play, the cards also are predisposed to “top 
trumps,” a game in which a mine category is used to determine 
supremacy. For example, players will designate a 
category, such as diameter, to specify highest 
and lowest value in winning. In doing 
so, players, especially children, 
absorb technical details easily.
A deck of cards is £7.05, in-
clusive of VAT where applicable 
(approximately US$9.05); ship-
ping rates are determined based 
on destination. The company also 
offers a database of more than 
10,000 mine and ordnance imag-
es and can tailor card decks to 
specific needs. 
For more information on the 
cards or to place an order, visit 
www.ckingassociates.co.uk. 
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researched	 as	 extensively	 as	 APMs	 have	
been.	This	is	due	largely	to	the	strength	and	
success	 of	 the	 Ottawa	 Convention,	 which	
has	 provided	 far	 more	 financial	 support,	
research	 and	 political	 pressure	 toward	 rid-
ding	countries	of	the	scourge	of	landmines	






mines,	 booby	 traps	 and	 IEDs,	 is	 coordi-
nated	 and	 focused	 on	 with	 equal	 priority.	
It	was	only	 in	200,	 for	 example,	 that	 the	
U.S.	 Department	 of	 Defense	 obtained	 a	
change	of	its	legislative	authority	to	broaden	
its	humanitarian	mine-action	efforts	 to	 in-
clude	 ERW,	 29	 showing	 that	 for	 many,	 the	




work	 of	 UXO	 and	 AXO.	 The	 GICHD	
notes	that	since	there	is	no	common	stan-
dard	 for	 reporting	 post-conflict	 casualties	
and	the	type	of	explosive	ordnance	cleared,	
there	is	not	even	an	“accurate	and	objective	
assessment	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 specific	 types	










ditional	 research	 about	 and	 standardized	






view	 of	 casualties	 caused	 by	 specific	 types	
of	 ERW”	 with	 reports	 including	 not	 only	
generic	type	but	also	condition	(blind/dud,	
field	storage,	rigged	as	IED	or	booby	trap).21	
Such	 an	 understanding	 of	 ERW	 function-
ally	 includes	mines,	booby	 traps	and	IEDs	





The	 understanding	 of	 threats	 and	 inci-
dence	of	post-conflict	casualties	needs	to	be	
improved,	and	clearance	and	risk-education	
efforts	 need	 to	 be	 effective.	 This	 will	 re-
quire	coordination	between	mine	and	ERW	
policy	and	practice,	development	of	a	deeper	





is	 it	more	 effective	 to	have	one	EOD	team	
working	 to	 clear	 both	 mines	 and	 ERW,	 or	
should	 they	 be	 cleared	 separately	 to	 work	




ernments,	 organizations	 and	 workers	 share	




ERW	 clearance	 become	 more	 exclusively	











ments	 will	 address	 the	 problem	 and	 clear-
ance	of	ERW.	States	Parties	must	first	decide	






















explosive	 elements	 remaining	 after	 conflict	
in	 both	 research	 and	 cleanup	 efforts.	 Our	
challenge	will	be	to	understand	and	apply	le-
gal	 requirements	 that	 enforce	 commitment	
to	 cleanup	 of	all	 explosive	 ordnance,	 from	
ERW	 as	 legally	 defined	 (including	 UXO,	
AFVs,	SALW	and	caches)	 to	mines,	booby	
traps,	 IEDs	 and	 other	 devices.	 Ultimately,	
defining	 ERW	 should	 not	 create	 regression	




For additional references for this article, 
please visit http: / /maic.jmu.edu/feature /
ressler /ressler.htm/#addlrefs.



















A pile of abandoned munitions.
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